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Tibbetts Point Lighthouse. Photo from www.uscg.mil/History/weblighthouses/LHNY.asp

The following is a great read on how to preserve and promote our Coast Guard’s history & heritage.  According to Jaegun Lee of Watertownnews.com:

The search for past Tibbetts Point lighthouse keepers is complete.

Joseph P. Dudek, president of the Tibbetts Point Lighthouse Historical Society, said he identified 35 keepers and has ordered a memorial plaque to honor those who kept the light shining at Tibbetts Point.

“I have gone ahead and ordered the plaque from the foundry,” Mr. Dudek said. “We should have it about the beginning of March.”

The 16-by-24-inch bronze plaque will list the names of all 35 keepers beneath emblems of the U.S. Lighthouse Service and U.S. Coast Guard. It will be placed on the foghorn building next to the lighthouse.

Rest of article here.

Additional information from the U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office:

ST. LAWRENCE RIVER/LAKE ONTARIO

Station Established: 1827

Year Current Tower(s) First Lit: 1854

Operational? YES

Automated? YES 1981

Deactivated: n/a

Foundation Materials: NATURAL/EMPLACED

Construction Materials: BRICK/STUCCO

Tower Shape: CONICAL

Markings/Pattern: WHITE W/BLACK LANTERN

Relationship to Other Structure: SEPARATE

Original Lens: FOURTH ORDER, FRESNEL 1854

For more about the Tibbetts Point Lighthouse, click here.

What have you done to promote & preserve our Coast Guard’s history & heritage?

(Originally posted over at An Unofficial Coast Guard Blog)

A comment on a post over at Lex’s Place caught my eye, and got me thinking, difficult as that might be to believe at times.   The particular comment is extracted by Lex from a post by Eric Posner:

The persistence of policies across ideologically divided administrations is good evidence that those policies are now mainstream rather than partisan and ideological.

The rest of Posner’s paragraph discussed specific policies and techniques in the War on Terror from the Bush Administration kept in place by President Obama, in many cases despite extreme criticism during the 2008 campaign.  However, the larger point is a very interesting one.   Effective policy tends to be consistent across politically diverse administrations.  Do we need, then, to forge a national security policy document that is to the War on Terror what NSC-68 was to the Cold War?

Seldom in US history have we had a persistent and grave threat that lasted for several administrations, over several decades.  Perhaps Germany in central Europe from 1890 to 1945 could be considered as such, but in that time really was two different entities.  Imperial Germany under the Kaiser differed greatly from a Nazi Germany under Hitler.   As did the dangers each posed, and the measures necessary to defeat them.  And there was an uneasy 20-year peace in the interim.

It was, rather, the Soviet Union (with China, before the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s) that presented a common threat, a common theme, for the national security policy of every US President from Truman to Reagan.  The document that outlined the US approach to the Soviets in a bi-polar Cold War world was the famous 57-page NSC-68.  Written by Paul Nitze in April of 1950, the document was a summation of the ideas of George F. Kennan, former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union and other influential figures.

The tenets of NSC-68 as a basis for US response to the Soviet threat are brilliantly put forth in John Lewis Gaddis’ masterpiece “Strategies of Containment” published in the early 1980s.  NSC-68 formally was the basis for US foreign policy during the years of Truman’s “containment” strategy, as the title of the book alludes.  But the clear and effective statement of the Soviet threat, and the US response, resonated far beyond Truman’s years in the Oval Office.  Indeed, NSC-68’s basic assertions held true during Eisenhower’s “New Look”, JFK’s “Flexible Response”, the Vietnam years under Johnson, Nixon’s “Detente”, Carter’s years, right up to the Reagan Administration’s final challenge of the “Evil Empire” (which, Maggie, is NOT the Yankees).

NSC-68 presents Soviet Russia as an enemy having a “fanatical faith…  antithetical to America”, a phrase that rings true of the radical Muslims who oppose the United States and the West.    The threat, in all its forms, is not going away any time soon.  Like the Soviet threat, we must be prepared for a decades-long struggle against it.  Also like the Soviets, radical Muslim fundamentalism is not merely a military threat, with nations and groups on the periphery whose dislike for America and Western society will cause them to look for economic opportunities in the problems and threats that the fundamentalists pose to us.  Nor, like the Soviets, is it our only threat.  But it is, for the near future, our gravest.

It is time, perhaps, to craft a US national security document that effectively and definitively states America’s intentions and position regarding the threat of radical Muslim fundamentalism.  Such a document does not yet formally exist, though like the development of NSC-68, there is much to draw from.  A new NSC-68 would bring a consistency to US national security policy that would endure past the four year Presidential election cycles, and dampen what can be at times the commands for radical course change before the rudder swings back toward amidships.

Harry S Truman was a President not considered a foreign policy success, one who got America into an unpopular and undeclared war described as the “wrong place, wrong time”.  Yet, his actions to contain the Soviets were, in the end, effective.  And it was his Administration that produced a policy document that provided direction for succeeding Presidents for the next four decades.  The historical view of Truman has changed definitely for the better, and in part, NSC-68 is a reason why.

George W Bush is not now considered a foreign policy success.  He also got America into an unpopular war that some claim was the wrong time and place.  But, like Truman, his actions to contain the fundamentalist Muslim threat were, in the end, effective.  Out of his Administration’s seven years of the Global War on Terror may come the next NSC-68, shaped perhaps, by the new Administration.  And the historical view of George W Bush may undergo a similar revision.

The fact that so many of the Bush-era policies are still in place in the Obama Administration, one so widely divergent in political philosophy from its predecessor, points to the usefulness and value of those policies.  Such, as Posner rightfully points out, is the litmus test of effectiveness.

Fellow USNIBlog Shipmates Galrahn, EagleOne and myself dedicated yesterday’s Midrats radio show to the subject of piracy.

We had as our guest for most of the hour Claude Berube, a teacher at the U.S. Naval Academy with a background in naval research and development, acquisition, and intelligence. He is also co-author of two books, a former Senate Staffer, and as a LCDR in the USNR has experience in maritime interception operations, humanitarian relief, and anti-piracy.

In his blog at Fleet Forces Command, Admiral J. C. Harvey has presented us with the question that dominates the American military during times of shrinking budgets and uncertain policies.  Though framed in the context of Fleet Forces Command, the question he asks is germane to units at all levels of command, across the entire of DoD as a whole.  The question, identifying the difference between taking risks and lowering standards, drives perhaps the majority of concerns expressed in forums like this one.   And in the first decade of the 21^st Century, there is added complication.

The simple answer to the question is that risk is (theoretically) a calculation between potential gain and possible loss.  The assumption of risk is thought of as an informed decision, for which at least some mitigation is possible.  A lowering of standards, on the other hand, has a potentially much wider and more permanent impact on capability.  Lowering of standards, of course, involves risk, but the amount of risk becomes increasingly unclear as levels of proficiency decline and acceptable errors rise.  This is true in business and industry, true in medicine, and holds true in military matters.

When both resources (including manpower) and proficiency decline, maintenance of standards becomes increasingly difficult.  At some point, standards cannot be maintained.  Industry and medicine have sophisticated metrics for tracking the second-order and third order trends that indicate performance.  In the military, despite some limited ability to do so (though false metrics are legion, especially in trying to evaluate combat units), there are two distinct characteristics of today’s military organizations that render the danger of such a decline in standards considerably more likely.

The first is the ingrained mentality of the “can do” attitude.  This attitude is absolutely essential in order to be a successful leader at any level in the armed forces.  It is what carries units past what they thought they could do, and wins fights that would otherwise be lost.  “Do more with less” is a logical offshoot of that.  Such has always been the case in a high-quality military force, and will likely remain so.  But it is not without its very real dangers, like anything else, when taken to extreme or when mixed with less desirable traits.

The second characteristic is that of a creeping, sometimes paralytic indecisiveness, manifested in the decreasing ability to prioritize.  This characteristic is not only unnecessary and undesirable in a military commander, but is often a fatal flaw.  But it is there in growing measure.  The reason for such, unfortunately, is not due to any particular personal trait.  If it were, that person could be removed, relieved, or reassigned.  No, sadly, the phenomenon has its roots in an increasing institutional aversion to risk.  It is not the risk of failure that oftentimes causes commanders to shudder, though how that is defined has morphed, but rather the risk of CRITICISM.   The leader who never makes a decision can never be criticized for making a bad decision.  It is, in today’s environment of micro-examination and second guessing, a survival mechanism of sorts, perhaps even a seemingly reasonable one.  Problem is, indecisiveness is the one drawback that is unacceptable for a military leader.  (Do SOMETHING, Lieutenant!!!!)  When time or the enemy make a decision for you, the result is never good and often catastrophic.  The enemy is more than happy to seize the initiative, and it is usually hell getting it back.

And here is where the two seemingly opposite characteristics meet.  The danger of the “can do” attitude I alluded to above is that, of course, there will come a time when “can do” will cease to be a response to even a cursory examination of capabilities.  The commander or unit cannot do.  Has no chance to do.  The commander simply lacks the very minimum of resources to accomplish the mission.  Yet, the likelihood of honestly saying so is usually low.  Failure will be the result, which in the profession of arms is counted in terms of dead and wounded.   The importance of a command climate where commanders can talk to seniors honestly and willingly in such matters without fear of retribution cannot be overstated.  The mission still may be assigned, but the risks become known, might possibly be mitigated, and the chances for success improved substantially.

The Clinton Administration’s shrunken budgets in the wake of Aspin’s Bottom Up Review (BUR) resulted in a hollow force.  The table of organization for a particular kind of unit is arrived at using a great deal of calculation based on mission and equipment density.   However, in Second MarDiv anyway, even deploying units never carried a full T/O.  The “authorized manning level” was a euphemism for a manpower shortage of between fifteen and twenty percent.   Have that, and “you have what you are supposed to have”.   But of course, you don’t.   Reality was that you were somewhat shy of that “authorized manning level”, usually about 90% of that budget-driven shortage.   Almost universally, there was a full table of equipment (T/E) to care for.  Yet, to submit major end items, especially weapons such as howitzers, into long-term preservation because of a lack of manpower, was highly frowned upon.   To do so was not displaying a “can do” attitude, and leaving a command open for criticism.  However, I would submit that an artillery battery that has 24 cannoneers on its roster to operate and maintain six guns when the T/O calls for 66, has gone well past the line of “taking risk”, and began “lowering standards” especially regarding maintenance, long ago.

I will relate a quick anecdote regarding vehicle maintenance, and express here my admiration for both of the participants in the conversation.  While in II SRIG, I was checking on some of my unit’s trucks that were in the maintenance shop, when the SRIG CO happened by.   A calm, intelligent, even-keeled man, the Colonel came over to where I was talking with the Maintenance Officer.  He observed the Marines working, and the overall impression of the shop.  To my surprise, the Colonel asked the MO (a CWO3), “How thoroughly is scheduled preventative maintenance being done on these trucks?”  It was a question that was not asked arbitrarily.

To my greater surprise, the CWO3 answered, “Colonel, you are lucky if most of these trucks get a half-assed look over”.   The Colonel did not react, (I tried not to), but instead calmly asked why that was.  “Because I have three qualified mechanics, and I am supposed to have seventeen.  These guys are working 14-16 hours a day just to repair normal maintenance issues”.  The Colonel simply said “Gotcha, thanks for the info”, and continued his walk-through.   Mechanics became a priority for that unit in short order.   The Colonel inspected what he expected, and being a leader, made sure his Marines had the tools and people to do the job.  I know for a fact that he did not win any promotion points in the conversation he had with the CG.   But had we needed to go to war, and almost did, to Kosovo, we would have gone with well-maintained and combat-capable vehicles.  This, the Colonel has said, was HIS priority.

I use the example of my experience, but, as folks in Fleet Forces Command likely know, the same situation applies to ships’ crews, and aircraft maintenance, and just about every other manpower-intensive occupation, including intelligence analysis.   Also, I relate that because we are facing similar budget, end-item, maintenance, and most importantly, manpower shortfalls to what we lived through in the 1990s (and 1970s, and 1950s, and 1930s…).   The same tale can be woven with regards to training opportunities when operational tempo is so high.  People simply do not have the time to learn and master those skills and that knowledge that maintains an acceptable standard.    Standards are lowered, the quality of the training drops off, even more risk is assumed, and lives and missions are endangered.  US 20^th Century military history is replete with examples from both world wars and Korea.

There is another curious effect that the melding of “can do” and “everything has priority” yields.   That effect is the “zero-defect mentality” that we all swear to eradicate, but in reality perpetuate and sometimes strengthen.  Nothing must go wrong, as we often expect our charges to start out perfect and improve from there.  Not possible, and too often we define success not as mission accomplishment, but as nothing that got anyone in trouble.  Problem is, it isn’t really and truly a zero-defect mentality any longer.  There is another element to the mix.  Commands are willing to accept sometimes serious mistakes, defects, shortcomings in competence, poor judgment, insufficient tactical acumen, any number of things.  But there are certain of a category of transgressions that will render an otherwise competent, even outstanding leader, a dead-ender.  Say or do something offensive, raise a little hell on liberty, demonstrate the sometimes rougher side of a warrior ethos, and you will find yourself outside the circle.

Political correctness, driven by absolute intolerance of whatever is the socially unacceptable and egregious offense du jour, has blurred the focus of what types of leaders we need.  While giving lip service to excellence and professionalism, in actuality we inculcate mediocrity.  Aggressiveness, decisiveness, an uncompromising drive to succeed, the traits that have always been a part of a successful commander, are not nurtured but fact become career liabilities, when there is a patently false yardstick (political correctness) by which leaders are measured.   The ability to lead, to say what is meant, clearly and forcefully, has disappeared in a cloud of doublespeak and politically acceptable euphemisms.  That very situation impresses not at all the very people we are intending to lead.  They possess, and always have, that all-seeing eye for sincerity.

The tragedy of Fort Hood followed what was a maddening trail of criminal negligence on the part of Major Hasan’s seniors.  Why?  Political correctness in the form of diversity.  Major Hasan, being a Muslim, belongs to a minority group about which the US Army (and likely other services) has become overly sensitive not to be perceived as persecuting.  There was a blurring of duty and responsibility by the serving of two mutually exclusive agendas.  With Major Hasan, at Walter Reed, and then at Fort Hood, the push for diversity collided head-on with a professional obligation to evaluate an officer’s fitness for service.  In each of a dozen collisions, the politically correct but militarily meaningless objective of diversity won out.    The shameful USNA Color Guard incident bears the same origins.  The perception that the remarks of both the Commandant of Midshipmen and Superintendent of the Naval Academy remain somewhat less than truthful still strongly and understandably persists.

On the field of battle, three US Navy SEALS stand accused of crimes that by any objective understanding of the true nature of war anyone would find absurd.  Regardless of the outcome, the damage that such a situation has on the confidence that juniors have for their leaders is immeasurable.   The incident also amplifies an already prevalent impression that senior military leaders care more about promotion and position than they do about the men doing the fighting and bleeding.  It is getting harder to disagree with that impression.

Politically-driven agendas such as the goal of “diversity” driven so stridently by Admiral Roughead, and parroted rather shamefully by General Casey after Fort Hood, need to disappear.  Warriors, and not lawyers, need to fight wars.  This idea may seem unrealistic, a bit like a tilt at windmills. But what is required for this to be so is a display of moral courage from senior commanders (and some politicians) to do what is right.  I doubt that such a display takes any more courage than a Lance Corporal must summon in order to advance into the enemy’s fire, nor any more than a Corpsman must have to retrieve him from that fire should he be hit.

Admiral Harvey has his work cut out for him.  One can only wish him the best of luck, and admire him for the task he is taking on.   The question of the difference between “taking risks” and lowering standards is one that must be answered across the entire of the Armed Services.  A commander must balance optimism with realism, and focus first and exclusively on one end.  Train and prepare to fight and win our nation’s wars.  The equipment, the training, the manning, the command climate, all should be driven toward that end.  Everything else, no matter how important and well-intentioned it seems to us at this moment, is illusory.

From China today comes news today of a successful missile intercept test:

“BEIJING (AP) — China announced that its military intercepted a missile in mid-flight Monday in a test of new technology that comes amid heightened tensions over Taiwan and increased willingness by the Asian giant to show off its advanced military capabilities. The official Xinhua News Agency reported late Monday that ”ground-based midcourse missile interception technology” was tested within Chinese territory. ”The test has achieved the expected objective,” the three-sentence report said. ”The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country.” Monday’s report follows repeated complaints in recent days by Beijing over the sale by the U.S. of weaponry to Taiwan, including PAC-3 air defense missiles. These sales are driven by threats from China to use force to bring the island under its control, backed up by an estimated 1,300 Chinese ballistic missiles positioned along the Taiwan Strait.”

Of course China doesn’t do anything without some express purpose, and to that end we would note that today is the 3rd anniversary of the infamous ASAT test, conducted on 11 January 2007. Infamous, because of the on-orbit debris field it generated and near universal condemnation it engendered. So find ourselves three years later and coincident with that date and the announcement by the US of plans to go ahead with the sale of PAC-3 batteries to Taiwan as a (small) partial counter to the hundreds of SRBMs China has deployed.

Interesting times, eh?

From the Midway Roundtable comes word that another veteran of that battle has folded his wings.  CAPT Roy Gee, USN-Ret. who flew from USS Hornet (CV 8 ) with Bombing EIGHT quietly passed on 28 Dec 2009.  Details of his life may be found at the Roundtable’s site.  Also there is a first person account of Midway:

Suddenly, “Pilots Man Your Planes” was announced.  We all wished each other good luck as we left the ready room for the climb to the flight deck and our SBDs.  (And by the way, climbing up and down the ship ladders many times a day will get you in great physical condition!  Carriers didn’t have escalators in those days.)

” I met my R/G, Radioman First Class Canfield at our assigned SBD and went over our mission and recognition charts with him.  I don’t know which particular aircraft (side number) we flew that day—my only record of that went down with the Hornet at the Battle of Santa Cruz.

After completing an inspection of the aircraft and its bomb, Canfield and I climbed into the cockpits.   As I sat there waiting for the signal to start engines, I suddenly got the same feeling of apprehension and butterflies in the stomach that I got before the start of competition in high school and collegiate athletics. The butterflies left after takeoff as I focused on navigating and flying formation.  Our two squadrons (VB-8 and VS-8) rendezvoused in two close-knit, stepped-down formations on each side of CHAG’s section, which consisted of CHAG and VS-8 wingman ENS Ben Tappman and VB-8 wingman ENS Clayton Fisher.  CHAG’s section was flying above and somewhat separated from VB-8/VS-8 and was escorted by 10 VF-8 F4Fs. As we proceeded to climb to 19,000 ft, we soon lost visual contact with VT-8.  We were maintaining absolute radio silence and were on oxygen, and our engines were on high blower.  I eased my fuel mixture control back to a leaner blend in order to conserve fuel as we leveled out at 19,000 feet and proceeded on our assigned course.” Read the rest here.

Rest in peace CAPT Gee with the thanks of those who honor your courage and action on that fateful day when so much hung in the balance.

The following contribution from Captain Victor Addison, OPNAV N51 Advanced Concepts, comes as a response to the discussions on Information Dissemination regarding the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) Version 3.0 in the context of Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

Captain Addison began the conversation with his analysis of the CCJO and the Navy with his January 2010 Proceedings article You Can’t Always Give What You Want available to Naval Institute subscribers.

I appreciate the spirited discussion on CCJO led by Galrahn and Prof. Rubel (also here, here, here, and here).  To clarify two things about my article, I’d like to point out the following: 1) My intent was to examine Navy support to joint force objectives in our expected operating environment (as defined by the NDS, CCJO and JOE) and consider issues related to readiness, training, and ops. With the exception of highlighting the virtues of multimission ships, I am not advancing any particular force structure argument. 2) My reference to sea control as being part of our particular service dialect means that this is a fundamental capability (often referred to in varying degrees as maritime superiority, supremacy, or dominance) that the joint force needs the Navy to provide. JFCOM’s stated intent in providing a capstone concept is that service concepts can be developed to complement it.  This is why we don’t see a discussion of sea control in the CCJO.

The extensive review of joint force “activities” by Galrahn highlights a potential point for consideration in the next CCJO rev.  Much of the recent effort to assess our strategy in Afghanistan could be distilled down to questions like: “what are our goals?” and “what kind of war are we fighting?” These are not simple questions. Defining the four basic categories of joint force activities as combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction might be technically correct, but this approach leaves a lot to the imagination–particularly since combat is the only activity that is the exclusive purview of DoD as the supported agency. Perhaps CCJO could be a sort of “Rosetta Stone” to translate grand strategy into joint operations by discussing broad categories of “joint force objectives” such as:

• –DEFEATING adversaries (state, state-sponsored, international etc.)
• –SUPPORTING allied/friendly governments and populations
• –DEFENDING the homeland
• –SECURING the global commons and ungoverned spaces

Without objectives, activities (the joint force “toolbox”) lack purpose and have no defined end state.  For example, “engagement” sounds like a worthwhile activity, but we need to associate this activity with an objective to calibrate our efforts and assess results.

Military History Buffs recently scoped out Mt. Vernon on a cold, windy day. We had not visited the site in more than 25 years when we were given a tour of the house on a school field trip. By intention, the house hasn’t changed much and, to their credit, the Mount Vernon Ladies Association convinced the federal government to purchase land across the Potomac from Mt. Vernon in order to preserve the historic view. (Imagine how disconcerting it would be to tour this meticulously preserved 18th century house and then have your historic frame of mind jarred by 21st century, cookie cutter housing developments just across the river from the back yard!) The historic interpreters do a formidable job of telling you what colonial life was like and what kind of plantation owner George Washington was. You learn about how he liked to work at his desk, where he slept, how he treated his slaves and how close he was to Mrs. Washington. And you learn all of this through artifacts. Which is nice. But it tells you little about the leadership trajectory of General Washington, the challenges he faced as the Revolution leader and the legendary accomplishments he achieved in that War and as our nation’s first president.

Then, we walked into the new Visitors Center and were blown away. Not only is the building well integrated into the landscape of the grounds, but it achieves what artifacts and the house never could. We slowly walked through the path of the exhibit (we didn’t want to miss anything!) that guides you through the life of George Washington and, through images, sounds, interactive touch screens, and surround-sound videos, we really became acquainted with the man, the General and the President. We got to know him intimately – at various ages and stages in his life. We experienced George Washington. We look forward to going back in the spring and the summer to explore the distillery, walk the grounds and to go through the exhibit again! And what is amazing to us is that this museum and historic house has been funded by several generations of determined women (the Mount Vernon Ladies Association) who underwrote the entire project with private dollars!

So, why can’t the Navy do this? We’ve been to Pensacola – hats off to that facility and organization that has made the National Museum of Naval Aviation publicly accessible and a true educational experience, taking advantage of the latest in museum technology and best practices. The Air Force has a great museum in Dayton. We can’t say enough about the inspirational and educational new Marine Corps Museum in Quantico. And we hope that the new Army museum will be first rate, although its planned location in Belvoir is problematic. But, what about the Navy? Aside from Pensacola, why can’t the rest of the Navy museums get into the 21st century? They need to have fewer glass exhibit cases, musty uniforms and inoperable cannons. They need to have more exhibits like the ones in Pensacola and the USS Midway museum that give visitors of all ages a taste of the Navy experience – both past and present. Let visitors actually feel what it was like on a submarine with no air conditioning in World War II. Challenge people to explore a swift boat and give them a view of what the Navy crew might have seen along the banks of the Mekong Delta. Give kids a chance to really feel how hard it is to train to be a Navy SEAL. That’s what will give visitors an understanding and an appreciation for the Navy.

USS Turner DD 648 (April 1943)

0600L Aboard the Gleaves-class destroyer USS Turner (DD 648) the crew is either moving to breakfast or to stations in preparation for a 0700 underway time for the Brooklyn Navy Yards for a scheduled refit and repair period. Laid down in November 1942 and commissioned in April 1943, she is the second ship to bear the name of War of 1812 hero Captain Daniel Turner. With LCDR Henry Wygant commanding, she participated in three wartime convoys, engaging a probable German sub on the third: